We explore the effects of environmental and trade policies with negative consumption externalities when a domestic firm and a foreign rival produce imperfect substitutes and compete in the domestic market. Consumption of the foreign product generates more externalities than that of the domestic product. Emission taxes lower emissions, harms the foreign firm, but may benefit the domestic firm. Tariffs could reduce externalities more "effectively" than emission taxes. Consumption subsidies provided to the domestic product may raise emissions and worsen domestic welfare. Stringent environmental policies may induce the foreign firm to produce an environmentally friendly good, though externalities may not decrease.
Introduction
Environmental deterioration is now worldwide concerns. To cope with the concerns, various environmental policies have been employed all over the world. However, some countries (mainly, developed countries) are concerned about environmental damages more seriously than some others (mainly, developing countries). 1 The former tend to adopt tougher policies, which may result in environmentally friendly products. For example, exhaust emission and fuel consumption regulations are more stringent in developed countries than in developing countries and hence automobiles in developed countries are environmentally cleaner. However, such stringent environmental policies may create trade barriers. In particular, this is the case if it is difficult for foreign firms to comply with domestic environmental regulations, standards, rules, etc.
On the other hand, trade policies are used to protect environment. For instance, trade restrictions are authorized under multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer to protect environment and to encourage non-signatories of the MEAs to change their environmental policies. However, trade policies are sometimes used to protect domestic producers under a pretext for environmental protection, which is called "disguised protection". Examples include the US ban on imports of yellowfin tuna and their related processed products from Mexico based on the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 2 The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of environmental and trade policies in the framework of international oligopoly. Economic activities could damage environment at various stages: production, transportation, and consumption stages. Since there are many studies that explore production externalities, we focus on negative externalities associated with consumption (including disposal) such as emissions of carbon dioxide, sulfur oxide and nitrogen oxide through driving cars. 3 Thus, environmental and trade policies are directly related to consumption. In the case of environmental tax, for example, we consider taxes on consumption.
In our model, a domestic firm and a foreign rival produce slightly differentiated 1 A typical argument is the environmental Kuznets Curve. See Grossman and Krueger (1993) , for example. 2 The United States also restricted imports of shrimp and shrimp products from India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines in 1990's. 3 For those studies that analyze various policies with production externalities in the context of international trade, see Furusawa et al. (2004) , Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) , Ishikawa and Kuroda (2007) , and Ishikawa and Okubo (2008) , among others. See also footnote 6. products and compete in the domestic market. Both domestic and foreign products generate negative externalities during consumption. We consider a situation in which the foreign product results in more externalities than the domestic product. For example, foreign cars (say, gasoline cars) emit more carbon dioxide than domestic cars (say, hybrid cars).
We explore two kinds of policies: taxes/subsidies and standards. Specifically, we consider discriminative policies, because the degrees of externalities are different across goods. In the case of environmental taxes, the tax rates are higher for the foreign good than the domestic good. We also examine tariffs and compare them with environmental taxes. With respect to subsidies, we consider consumption subsidies provided to the domestic good, i.e., the good generating less negative externalities, because such subsidies are widely observed. For instance, purchases of hybrid cars and/or electric cars are subsidized and/or are subject to tax reductions in a number of developed countries. In the analysis of standards, we focus on the case in which the foreign good does not meet domestic standards. It is often observed that governments prohibit firms from selling those products that do not achieve certain standards. 4 In the framework of international oligopoly, many studies have focused on strategic interactions between governments with production externalities. 5 However, relatively little attention has been paid to environmental and trade policies with consumption externalities. 6 By using a simple international duopoly model, Lai (2004) considers the effects of trade liberalization on an environmental tax when externalities are associated with consumption. 7 Kayalica and Kayalica (2005) and Kayalica and Yilmaz (2006) analyze reciprocal dumping in the presence of consumption externalities. Fischer and Serra (2000) explore minimum standards on a good produced by a domestic firm and a foreign competitor when the consumption causes local damage. They consider optimal standards and examine whether they are protectionist. Abe et al. (2001) investigate eco- 4 In addition to the above-mentioned US bans on imports of yellowfin tuna and their related processed products and of shrimp and shrimp products, Venezuelan-refined gas was forced to meet the same reformulation standards as U.S. in 1994. The EU prohibited the use of chrysotile asbestos products and banned their imports from Canada in 1998. In 2002, China introduced the China Compulsory Certification, under which foreign firms cannot export to China without implementing certain standards. 5 See Barret (1994), Kennedy (1994) , Conrad (1996 Conrad ( ,2001 ), Ulph (1996) , Tanguay (2001) , and Kiyono is on eco-labelling scheme and hence differs from ours.
When domestic policies are very stringent, foreign firms may have an incentive to circumvent them. For example, when a foreign product does not meet domestic standards, its producer may develop a new product which reaches them. It is also widely observed that a firm obtains license to produce an environmentally friendly product from its rival firm or is supplied key inputs to clear standards by its rival. 8 In particular, domestic firms may strategically license their technologies or supply inputs to foreign rivals if they are willing to engage in R&D. This is because such a strategy mitigates the loss of the domestic firms caused by the entry of the foreign firms. 9 However, we point out that the foreign government may try to shift the rent from domestic firms. Moreover, stringent policies inducing R&D or licensing may not decrease externalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we present a basic model which is an international Cournot duopoly model. As consumption externalities, we consider a situation under which consumption generates emissions that deteriorate environment. Then we examine emission taxes, tariffs, and consumption subsidies in section 3 and emission standards in section 4. In section 5, we consider the foreign production of an environmentally friendly good through either R&D or licensing. Section 6 concludes. 8 For example, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC) and PSA Peugeot Citroën have announced that MMC will provide PSA an MMC-made electric vehicle for Europe. The vehicle will be sold under Peugeot brand, in parallel to Mitsubishi's own vehicle. Nissan Motor Co. is developing lithium-ion batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles. They are planning to provide it to other auto makers. 9 Strategic use of licensing to (partially) deter entry has been studied in the literature of industrial organization which basically deals with a closed economy. See Gallini (1984) and Yi (1999) , for example.
Consider two goods Z and Y , which are imperfect substitutes. Good Z is produced by a foreign firm (firm f ), that exports the good to the domestic country. In the domestic country, a domestic firm (firm d) produces good Y . The two firms engage in Cournot competition in the domestic market. 10 We assume that emissions are generated through consumption of the products. By an appropriate choice of units, one unit of consumption of good Z generates one unit of emissions and that of good Y results in 0 ≤ k < 1 units of emissions. The emissions cause negative externalities.
Demands are characterized by a representative consumer that consumes goods Z and Y as well as a numéraire good. The numéraire good is competitively produced and freely traded between countries, and generates no externalities. We assume the following utility function:
where z, y and m are, respectively, the consumption of goods Z and Y and the numéraire good, V is externalities, α and β are parameters, and 0 < φ < 1 is a parameter indicating the degree of substitutability between the two goods. Following Fischer and Serra (2000) and Lai (2004), we assume that the representative consumer ignores the negative externalities when making the consumption decisions. 11 Then the inverse demands for the imperfectly substitutable goods Z and Y are, respectively, given by
where p z and p y are the consumer prices of goods Z and Y .
The domestic government may impose an emission tax, τ , per unit of emissions. With an emission tax, the producer prices of firms f and d are, respectively, p z −τ and p y −kτ .
The profits of firms f and d can be written respectively as where c j (j = y, z) is the constant marginal cost (MC) to produce good j. The domestic government may impose a specific tariff, t z , on good Z or provide a specific consumption subsidy, ς, to good Y . 12 Then the first order conditions (FOCs) for profit maximization are:
In the laissez-faire equilibrium denoted by subscript 0, we have
where A ≡ α − c z and B ≡ β − c y . We focus on interior solutions (except for section 4).
Thus, we assume
By using the FOCs, the profits of firms f and d are
Thus, the following lemma is immediate:
The profits increase if and only if the output rises.
It should be noted that this lemma is valid even if taxes/subsidies exist.
Effects of Taxes and Subsidies
In this section, we consider the effects of emission taxes, tariffs, and consumption subsidies to good Y . We also compare emission taxes against tariffs.
Emission Taxes
Unless k = 0, both firms have to pay the tax. The outputs are
In our model, consumption subsidies to good Y are equivalent to production subsidies to good Y .
where subscript τ denotes the equilibrium with an emission tax. The introduction of an emission tax, respectively, changes the outputs of firms f and d as follows:
The output of firm f necessarily decreases, but that of firm d decreases if and only if φ < 2k. Since Lemma 1 is still valid here, the effects on the profits are straightforward.
Interestingly, although both firms have to pay the tax with k > 0, firm d could benefit from the tax. This result stems from the difference in the tax rates. An emission tax generates two opposing effects on the outputs. An emission tax decreases the output of each firm, which in turn increases the output of its rival with strategic substitutes. Since the former effect is stronger for firm f than firm d, the latter effect is stronger for firm d than firm f . If k is relatively small, that is, if the tax rate of firm d is relatively small, the latter effect could dominate the former for firm d.
The change in the total emissions, e(≡ z + ky), is given by
which implies that the total emissions fall and hence emission taxes are effective to reduce the emissions. The change in consumer surplus (CS) is
We can verify that a small emission tax may increases CS. 13 We next consider the effect on domestic welfare W measured by CS, the profits of firm d, tax revenues, and the value of environmental damage. The total emissions cause environmental damage, V (e), with V 0 (e) > 0.
. 13 The effect of introducing a small emission tax on CS is given by lim τ →0 (∆CS τ /τ ). If A = B, then CS falls. However, if B and φ are relatively large and k is relatively small, CS could rise.
Here we examine the welfare effect of introducing a small emission tax. Differentiating domestic welfare with respect to τ and evaluating it at τ = 0, we have
Tariffs
We now suppose that a tariff is introduced instead of an emission tax. The outputs under a tariff are given by
where subscript t denotes the tariff equilibrium. The changes in the outputs of firms f and d are, respectively, given by
The output of firm f decreases, while that of firm d increases. The change in the emissions is
As expected, a tariff harms firm f , benefits firm d and reduces the emissions.
The change in CS is
Interestingly, a tariff could increase CS. This is possible, because the goods are differentiated. If the goods are homogeneous, a tariff necessarily reduces CS. In our model, consumers are likely to gain when B and φ are relatively large. 14 A relatively large B implies a relatively large demand for good Y . 15 When the demand for good Y is relatively large, the gains from the increase in the consumption of good Y dominates the loss from the decrease in the consumption of good Z. 16 Moreover, the loss becomes smaller as consumers regard the two goods as being more similar. Even if consumers lose, a small tariff always enhances domestic welfare by reducing the emissions and shifting rent from abroad:
Thus, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 2 A tariff harms firm f , benefits firm d, decreases the total emissions, and raises domestic welfare. CS may not decrease.
Next we compare emission taxes with tariffs. We specifically make a comparison when both taxes and tariffs result in the same emission levels. From (4) and (5), the total emissions are the same if the tariff rate satisfies the following condition:
Thus, t ≷ τ if and only if φ ≶ 2k. To put it differently, when the emission tax rate and the tariff rate are the same, the total emissions are less under an emission tax if and only if φ < 2k.
We obtain
the sign of which is generally ambiguous. 17 Thus, a tariff that satisfies (6) may lead to higher welfare. Also we should recall that tariffs always enhance welfare, while emission taxes may worsen welfare. This implies that tariffs could be more attractive measures than emission taxes.
Therefore, we obtain:
14 If A = B, then a small tariff lowers CS. 15 Since B ≡ β − c y , B becomes larger as β becomes larger and/or c y becomes smaller. One may expect that α ≈ β holds when φ is sufficiently close to 1. However, α ≈ β does not necessarily imply A ≈ B. 16 We can easily verify this by differentiating CS t = [(z t ) 2 + (y t ) 2 ]/2 with respect to t. 17 If φ is close to zero, the sign depends on the sign of 8B − k (20τ − 8A) − 12k 3 τ .
Proposition 3
Suppose that the emission level under an emission tax is the same with that under a tariff. Then the tariff rate is higher than the emission tax rate if and only if φ < 2k. Domestic welfare under the tariff may or may not be higher than under the emission tax.
We briefly make another comparison when both taxes and tariffs result in the same import levels. As long as the import levels are identical, firm f is indifferent between emission taxes and tariffs. The import levels are the same when the tariff rate satisfies the following condition:
We can easily verify that the total emissions are less with emission taxes than with tariffs under (7). However, domestic welfare may or may not be higher with emission taxes than with tariffs.
Consumption Subsidies
We consider consumption subsidies provided to good Y . The effects of a consumption subsidy are similar to those of a tariff. As in the case of tariffs, a subsidy decreases the output of firm f and increases the output of firm d:
where subscript ς denotes the equilibrium with a subsidy. However, the total emissions may increase:
∆e ς is negative if and only if 2k < φ. Since a subsidy increases the consumption of good Y more than a tariff, the total emissions rise unless k is small.
The change in CS is
Since a consumption subsidy decreases the consumption of good Z, a small subsidy may decrease CS. This is likely to be the case when A and φ are relatively large. The welfare effect of a small subsidy is also generally ambiguous:
raises domestic welfare. Conversely, a small subsidy could increase the emissions and decrease domestic welfare (see the appendix). 18 This is likely to occur when B (i.e., the market for good Y ) is relatively small and k is relatively large. When B is relatively small, the increases in both CS in the market of good Y and the domestic profits are relatively small. Thus, the first term in (8) could become negative. In this case, a consumption tax on good Y rather than a subsidy could be justified from the viewpoint of both welfare enhancement and emission reduction.
Thus, we obtain:
Proposition 4 A consumption subsidy to good Y decreases the total emissions if and only if 2k < φ. A small subsidy may raise the total emissions and lower domestic welfare.
Effects of Standards
In this section, we consider the effects of emission standards. The domestic government introduces an emission standard which sets a maximum amount of emissions per unit of product consumption. If a product does not satisfy the standard, its sale is prohibited in the domestic country. In our analysis, we specifically consider an emission standard which good Z does not satisfy but good Y does. Thus, in the presence of such a standard, firm f has to give up exporting to the domestic country.
In this case, firm d becomes a monopolist in the market. The equilibrium output and price are, respectively, given by
In view of (2), we can easily verify that y S > y 0 and y S < z 0 + y 0 . As expected, therefore, the standard benefits the domestic firm and reduces emissions. Although the total supply of the goods falls, domestic consumers may gain. The change in CS is
Since 2A − φB > 0, ∆CS S > 0 holds if and only if Λ ≡ 8A − 12Bφ + 2Aφ 2 + Bφ 3 < 0.
Again, CS is likely to increase when both B and φ are relatively large. When the 18 It is also possible that a small subsidy increases (decreases) the emissions but enhances (lowers)
welfare.
consumption of good Y is relatively large, the gains from the increase in the consumption of good Y dominates the loss from the unavailability of good Z. A relatively large φ implies that consumers regard good Y as a very close substitute for good Z and hence the unavailability of good Z does not cause a serious loss to consumers. We should emphasize that CS could rise, because the goods are differentiated. If firms d and f produce homogeneous goods, the elimination of firm f from the market is harmful for consumers.
The change in domestic welfare is given by
Since ∆V S < 0, ∆W S > 0 holds if 8A − 28Bφ + 6Aφ 2 + 3Bφ 3 < 0 which holds with Λ < 0. Domestic welfare is likely to increase when both B and φ are relatively large.
Suppose, for example, A = B. Then domestic welfare rises if 4 √ 3/3 − 2 < φ < 1 holds.
Thus, the above analysis establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that firm f cannot export good Z to the domestic country because of a domestic emission standard. The emission standard lowers the total emissions and may benefit consumers and enhance domestic welfare.
Reentry of the Foreign Firm into the Domestic Market
In the presence of emission standards considered in the last section, firm f cannot serve the domestic market. Hence firm f may try to produce and export a new product, good X, which generates h units of emissions per unit of consumption and meets the standard, h, i.e., h ≤ h < 1. In this section, we examine such a situation. 19 We specifically consider two possibilities. In the first case, firm f incurs fixed R&D costs, F , to develop good X by itself. In the second, firm d licenses firm f a technology to produce good X. As pointed out by Ishikawa and Horiuchi (2008) , firm d may provide firm f a key input such as a hybrid engine to produce good X instead of a technology to produce the key input.
R&D
As long as firm f can make a positive profit from R&D, it has an incentive to invest in R&D. With R&D investment, firms f and d, respectively, supply goods X and Y to the domestic market. The degree of substitutability between the two goods, δ, is assumed to satisfy φ < δ ≤ 1. The inverse demand for each good is given by
where p x and x are the consumer price and output of good X, and γ is a parameter.
The profits of firms f and d are:
where c x is the constant MC of firm f to produce good X. In equilibrium, we have
where
We first consider whether firm d gains from the standard. Noting that Lemma 1 is still valid for firm d, we check whether the output rises:
Thus, the standard benefits firm d if and only if Ω ≡ 4Cδ − 4Aφ − 2Bδ 2 + 2Bφ 2 + Aδ 2 φ − Cδφ 2 < 0. Firm d necessarily loses if A = B = C holds, because A = C and φ < δ imply that the demand for good Y shrinks, because the two goods become closer substitutes.
The change in CS is given by
In general, the sign of ∆CS R is ambiguous. However, we can easily verify that ∆CS R < 0 if A = B = C. Again, the two goods become closer substitutes, which shrinks demands and hence CS decreases.
The change in emissions is given by
If h and k are sufficiently small, then ∆e R becomes negative, that is, the emission standard decreases the total emissions. However, if k and h are large enough, the total emissions may increase. Evaluating ∆e R at h = k = 1, we have
From the continuity argument, the total emissions increase if Ψ ≡ 2C − 2A − Aδ − Bδ + Bφ + Cφ > 0 and both k and h are sufficiently close to 1. We can verify that if
Thus, if A = B = C, an emission standard inducing firm f to develop good X harms firm d and consumers but reduces the total emissions. Now suppose Ψ > 0 and B = C.
loses and the total emissions increase if both k and h are sufficiently close to 1.
The above analysis establishes the following proposition: 
Licensing
We now examine firm d's technology licensing to firm f . When firm f will not develop good X, firm d has no incentive for licensing as long as δ is relatively high. This is because firm d can enjoy the monopoly situation without licensing. If δ is sufficiently low, however, firm d may have an incentive for licensing. 20 In this case, however, firm d will design licensing fees to extract all the rent from firm f . Therefore, we consider the case where in the absence of licensing, firm f is willing to develop good X through R&D, which harms firm d. In this situation, firm d has an incentive to grant firm f permission to use its technology to produce good X in return for a licensing fee, because licensing generates revenue for firm d and mitigates its loss. Thus, firm d designs a licensing contract so that firm f is willing to accept it. It should be noted that firm d cannot extract all the rent from firm f because of firm f 's outside option, i.e., R&D.
In the presence of licensing, profits of the two firms are given by
where R and r are, respectively, a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty. For simplicity, we assume that firm f 's MC under licensing and that under R&D are the same. Since the outside option for firm f is R&D, firm d faces the following maximization problem:
where π f R is firm f 's profits with R&D. The appendix proves the following lemma. 
This lemma implies that depending on the parameter values, there are three kinds of licensing contract. Comparing with the R&D case, the profits of firm d rise, because licensing generates a licensing fee and makes firm f less competitive with r > 0. In view of (5), the emissions are less under licensing than under R&D as long as r > 0.
Thus, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 7
Licensing increases the profits of firm d relative to R&D. The total emissions under licensing are less than or equal to those under R&D.
We should mention that in the presence of licensing, the foreign government can shift rent from firm d. Suppose that the foreign government imposes a tax on the licensing fee. This usually causes tax shifting. In our model, however, firm d cannot directly shift the tax to firm f , because the tax shifting leads firm f to engage in R&D. In fact, the foreign government could fully shift the licensing fee to the foreign country as a tax revenue. Suppose, for example, that firm f imports a key input at r = r with linear pricing. Then, the domestic government can impose a specific tariff r to fully shift the rent from firm d. In this case, the profits of firm d are larger in the licensing case than in the R&D case, but the sum of the domestic profits and CS is larger in the R&D case than in the licensing case. 21 21 The domestic government can shift some rent back to the domestic country by imposing a tariff on good X.
Thus, we obtain:
The foreign government can shift the licensing fee to the foreign country by imposing a tax on the fee.
Concluding Remarks
Using an international duopoly model, we have analyzed the effects of environmental and trade policies in the presence of consumption externalities. Both domestic and foreign products generate emissions during consumption, but the foreign product results in more damage to environment than the domestic product.
Emission taxes reduce negative externalities. The foreign firm necessarily loses from such taxes, while the domestic firm could gain. Tariffs also reduce negative externalities. Interestingly, however, tariffs could actually reduce externalities more effectively than taxes. This is because tariffs impact squarely on the foreign good which is environmentally less friendly. A small tariff always enhances domestic welfare, while a small emission tax may worsen welfare. Consumption subsidies provided to the domestic good may raise the total emissions and lower domestic welfare. This implies that under some situation, consumption subsidies to environmentally friendly goods such as hybrid and electric cars should be abolished or replaced by taxes.
Stringent environmental policies may induce the foreign firm to supply an environmentally friendly good through R&D or licensing. Such policies may not reduce the externalities. Comparing between R&D and licensing, the externalities may be less under licensing. We have also pointed out a possible strategic interaction between the domestic firm and the foreign government in the case of licensing.
The analysis of R&D and licensing can be applied to the case with production externalities. However, the GATT/WTO does not basically allow trade restrictions based on processes and production methods. Thus, even if foreign production generates negative externalities, the imports of foreign goods might not be prohibited.
Suppose B = λA. Then
We can find some φ < 1 which satisfies (2) and (A1) as long as 1/2 < λ < 5/7. Once φ is determined, we can easily find k < 1 that satisfies 2k > φ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given r, the equilibrium outputs are Thus,
If r * ≥ r, then firm d sets r = r and R = 0. If r * < r, on the other hand, firm d sets r = r * and
